Discretion in the Governance Work of Internal Auditors: Interplay Between Institutional Complexity and Organizational Embeddedness

Abstract This study examines which factors facilitate (obstruct) the discretion exercised by ground‐level governance actors, such as internal auditors, in justifying their governance work. To achieve this objective, we rely on two complementary theoretical perspectives. One perspective proposes that the organizational embeddedness of ground‐level governance actors, ordained by high‐level governance actors (such as the board of directors), obstructs their discretion. In contrast, the other perspective, building on institutional complexity, propounds that multiple institutional demands facilitate the situated agency and discretion of ground‐level governance actors. Consistent with the emerging multilevel research on institutional complexity, we combine these two perspectives by including both the structural and static meso‐level factors (i.e. organizational embeddedness) as well as actors' situated agency. Utilizing three comparative cases, we demonstrate that internal auditors' ability to exercise discretion is facilitated (obstructed) when organizational embeddedness enables (constrains) the cohabitation of multiple institutional logics at the organizational level. In doing so, we identify organizationally situated agency as an underlying factor driving internal auditors’ justification approaches in their governance work.