Porosity on the Thailand-Myanmar border: before and after Myanmar’s 2021 coup

Points of political crisis in Myanmar's history have been the catalyst for forced migration, and the Thailand-Myanmar border has, for decades, been a site of significant border-crossing. But while tens of thousands arrived in Thailand in the aftermath of previous crackdowns by Myanmar's military, the severity of the February 2021 coup has not been met with a commensurate increase in arrivals. What explains the difference? Over time, the border is demonstrating differential porosity. In this article I theorise the physical, political and social elements that shape border porosity and locate spaces where informality resides within these elements. I liken porosity to a circuit board that stretches deeply into stakeholder states, with dimmers or switches that control the porosity of the border. I examine the case of the Thailand-Myanmar border pre- and post-coup and find that the ability of local actors to exercise discretion in heeding government policy diminished over time. This decrease in informality conditioned the porosity of the border. Part geography, part policy, and part informal social construction, the concept of porosity focuses on the journey, responds to a call for radically decentring the migration governance literature, and helps to uncover the troubled possibilities that border-crossers and potential border-crossers face.