International Systems and Cognitive Dissonances: beyond rational agents

Understanding decision-making and strategy in international relations is enriched by an approach that takes into account different historical scales. Big History, which delves into the interplay of cultural, evolutionary, and cosmological processes, serves as a valuable tool in elucidating the strategic behavior of political actors. In a systemic setting where anticipatory capability stands as a paramount asset, this approach aids in pinpointing potential sources of disorder within the international arena. When policymakers seek to understand an interconnected web of actors, make informed decisions, and anticipate the actions of others, they draw on a complex set of mental tools. These tools combine cultural information with ethological cognitive archetypes, shaped by millions of years of natural selection in primate species and hardwired into the human collective unconscious. Cultural information, stemming from these archetypes, has the capacity to either augment or suppress the expression of these innate structures. At an unconscious level, the formation of ingroups is a socio-cognitive process enabling human agents to frame their relationships with ingroup members in prosocial and non-lethal terms. It acknowledges the presence of conflict for status and influence among ingroup members, yet ethological suppression mechanisms work to minimize the potential for lethal aggression, thereby preserving group cohesion. Hence, we posit that when systems of international relations are crafted to maintain the status quo between parties while simultaneously being founded on principles and institutions suggesting solidarity and cooperation, human policymakers may experience marginal cognitive dissonance at an unconscious level. Such cognitive dissonance, arising from these mixed signals, could incline policymakers to pursue policies contravening the terms of the system. While this phenomenon alone cannot solely account for systemic failure at the international level, it likely contributes to it. We suggest that policymakers engaged in diplomatic initiatives such as the Concert of Europe (1814-1815), the Washington Naval Treaty (1922) and the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (since 1970, and still in force), were (and continue to be) susceptible to this cognitive phenomenon on a regular basis.