Remote Power Side- Channel Attacks on FPGAs
Editor’s notes: Side-channel attacks, like those exploiting power and timing, are generally thought to require physical access to a system. This research challenges that idea by demonstrating how such attacks can be carried out on remote systems without physical access. It emphasizes the need to rethink how modern shared-FPGA systems are designed, prioritizing security as a core consideration. –Jeyavijayan Rajendran, Texas AM University, USA
Authors
- G. Edward Suh (ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0001-6409-9888)
- Mark Zhao (ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-0706-5208)
Institutions
- Nvidia (United States) (US)
- Stanford University (US)
Publication Details
- Journal
- IEEE Design and Test
- Published
- 2024-08-23
- DOI
- https://doi.org/10.1109/mdat.2024.3448371
- Citations
- 5
- Primary Topic
- Physical Unclonable Functions (PUFs) and Hardware Security
- Type
- article
- Field-Weighted Citation Impact
- 2.45