Methodological Implications of the Phenomenon of Mispresence

Contemporary psychology has typically endorsed two approaches to understanding expressed experience as narrative data: representation and presence. We argue that neither representation nor presence fully captures the nature of experience, especially insofar as distinctly ethical phenomena such as self-deception are part of our human behavioral repertoire. Developing more sensitive methodological approaches to the study of such experiences requires a fuller appreciation of the metaphysical, epistemological, and ethical nature of human behavior which informs human action and our forms of inquiry about it. Effectively addressing this aspect of our humanity will require a rather dramatic shift in our methodology-based understanding in psychology. In short, investigating fundamentally morally significant phenomena must be carried out in a way that acknowledges how the moral aspect of any phenomena is accounted for, and that requires careful understanding of the moral character of the most primitive level of experience. It is at this level that the phenomenon of mispresence is encountered. Therefore, this article seeks to unfold that phenomenon and articulate its implications for psychological study of lived experience.