Game-theoretic analysis of Net Neutrality effects

Net Neutrality imposes restrictions on the work of Internet Service Providers (ISPs), which can significantly affect social welfare. This article analyzes the following rules established by the Net Neutrality: zero price rule and the prohibition of exclusive deals between ISPs and Content Providers (CPs). The aim of the study is to determine the impact of Net Neutrality on the welfare of various groups of economic agents. To study these implications, the authors create a game-theoretic model of the ISPs market, the unique feature of which is the following heterogeneity of CPs: one large CP creates a large cross-side network effect for consumers and is able to strike exclusive deals with ISPs without Net Neutrality; many small CPs create a small network effect and are unable to influence prices. The following conclusions were obtained: there are ranges of model parameters in which Net Neutrality increases profits of ISPs and reduces profits of a large CP; increases total social welfare if a large CP joins both ISPs without Net Neutrality. The impact of Net Neutrality on consumer surplus and profits of small CPs at these parameter ranges depends on the exclusivity of a large CP in absence of Net Neutrality. Consequently, certain effects of Net Neutrality may differ dramatically depending on how widespread the exclusivity of CPs will be in its absence. These findings may help regulators better assess the implications of Net Neutrality and make a justified decision on its implementation.