Children Sustain Cooperation in a Threshold Public-Goods Game Even When Seeing Others’ Outcomes

Many societal challenges are threshold dilemmas requiring people to cooperate to reach a threshold before group benefits can be reaped. Yet receiving feedback about others' outcomes relative to one's own (<i>relative feedback</i>) can undermine cooperation by focusing group members' attention on outperforming each other. We investigated the impact of relative feedback compared to <i>individual feedback</i> (only seeing one's own outcome) on cooperation in children from Germany and India (6- to 10-year-olds, <i>N</i> = 240). Using a threshold public-goods game with real water as a resource, we show that, although feedback had an effect, most groups sustained cooperation at high levels in both feedback conditions until the end of the game. Analyses of children's communication (14,374 codable utterances) revealed more references to social comparisons and more verbal efforts to coordinate in the relative-feedback condition. Thresholds can mitigate the most adverse effects of social comparisons by focusing attention on a common goal.