Symmetric and Dual PRFs from Standard Assumptions: A Generic Validation of a Prevailing Assumption

Abstract A two-input function is a dual PRF if it is a PRF when keyed by either of its inputs. Dual PRFs are assumed in the design and analysis of numerous primitives and protocols including HMAC, AMAC, TLS 1.3 and MLS. But, not only do we not know whether particular functions on which the assumption is made really are dual PRFs; we do not know if dual PRFs even exist. What if the goal is impossible? This paper addresses this with a foundational treatment of dual PRFs, giving constructions based on standard assumptions. This provides what we call a generic validation of the dual PRF assumption. Our approach is to introduce and construct symmetric PRFs, which imply dual PRFs and may be of independent interest. We give a general construction of a symmetric PRF based on a function having a weak form of collision resistance coupled with a leakage hardcore function, a strengthening of the usual notion of hardcore functions we introduce. We instantiate this general construction in two ways to obtain two specific symmetric and dual PRFs, the first assuming any collision-resistant hash function and the second assuming any one-way permutation. A construction based on any one-way function evades us and is left as an intriguing open problem.

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Institutions

Publication Details

Journal
Journal of Cryptology
Published
2024-08-19
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1007/s00145-024-09513-6
Citations
2
Primary Topic
Cryptography and Data Security
Type
article
Field-Weighted Citation Impact
0.69

Funders

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article

Symmetric and Dual PRFs from Standard Assumptions: A Generic Validation of a Prevailing Assumption

Anna Lysyanskaya, Mihir Bellare
2 citations
Journal of Cryptology
Cryptography and Data Security
0.69
article

Symmetric and Dual PRFs from Standard Assumptions: A Generic Validation of a Prevailing Assumption

Anna Lysyanskaya, Mihir Bellare
article en
2 citations

Abstract

Abstract A two-input function is a dual PRF if it is a PRF when keyed by either of its inputs. Dual PRFs are assumed in the design and analysis of numerous primitives and protocols including HMAC, AMAC, TLS 1.3 and MLS. But, not only do we not know whether particular functions on which the assumption is made really are dual PRFs; we do not know if dual PRFs even exist. What if the goal is impossible? This paper addresses this with a foundational treatment of dual PRFs, giving constructions based on standard assumptions. This provides what we call a generic validation of the dual PRF assumption. Our approach is to introduce and construct symmetric PRFs, which imply dual PRFs and may be of independent interest. We give a general construction of a symmetric PRF based on a function having a weak form of collision resistance coupled with a leakage hardcore function, a strengthening of the usual notion of hardcore functions we introduce. We instantiate this general construction in two ways to obtain two specific symmetric and dual PRFs, the first assuming any collision-resistant hash function and the second assuming any one-way permutation. A construction based on any one-way function evades us and is left as an intriguing open problem.

Journal of CryptologyVol. 37(4)
Brown University (US), University of California San Diego (US)
National Science Foundation, King Abdulaziz City for Science and Technology, Simons Institute for the Theory of Computing, University of California Berkeley
Openalex Percentile: Top 25%
Cryptography and Data Security
0.69
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Symmetric and Dual PRFs from Standard Assumptions: A Generic Validation of a Prevailing Assumption — Anna Lysyanskaya, Mihir Bellare · Journal of Cryptology (2024) | TGRS Research Map | TGRS