Playing the <scp>CITES</scp> game: Lessons on global conservation governance from African megafauna

Abstract Growing awareness and concern over environmental issues has been accompanied by a proliferation of international environmental agreements during the last half‐century. Among these, the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES), stands out as one of the oldest and strongest influences on global biodiversity conservation policy. However, the effectiveness of CITES has been questioned—for various reasons and from various quarters—with a range of differing opinions. To provide further insight on this issue we drew from and built upon recent advances in the environmental governance literature to develop an approach to analysing how the CITES‐centred wildlife trading regime influences actor behaviour. After developing a rule‐categorised framework to analyse the structure of the treaty, we conducted dynamic analysis of actor behaviour using case study material on CITES‐listed African megafauna species (elephants, rhinoceroses, and lions), examining recent developments over a five‐year period (2016–2020). Drawing on this material, we further applied institutional diagnostics to gain insight into the conservation effectiveness of the CITES regime. Our analysis of these case studies suggests that CITES can be gamed by special interest groups and that its institutional design facilitates the evolution of an international prohibition regime. Our research produces novel insights into the operation of this process and raises concerns about consequences for African biodiversity conservation. We conclude with recommendations for wildlife trade policy reform and further research.