CONDORCET CONSISTENCY AND PAIRWISE JUSTIFIABILITY UNDER VARIABLE AGENDAS
Abstract We compare the consequences of imposing upon collective choice functions the classical requirement of Condorcet consistency with those arising when requiring the functions to satisfy the principle of pairwise justifiability. We show that, despite the different logic underlying these two requirements, they are equivalent when applied to anonymous and neutral rules defined over a class of domains. The class contains the universal, the single‐peaked, and that of order restriction, among other preference domains.
Authors
- Antonio Nicolò (ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0001-5405-4889)
- Salvador Barberà (ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0001-6586-2398)
- Bernardo Moreno (ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0003-0651-4427)
- Dolors Berga (ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-4873-7904)
Institutions
- Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona (ES)
- University of Padua (IT)
- Universitat de Girona (ES)
- University of Manchester (GB)
- Universidad de Málaga (ES)
Publication Details
- Journal
- International Economic Review
- Published
- 2024-08-16
- DOI
- https://doi.org/10.1111/iere.12728
- Citations
- 6
- Primary Topic
- Game Theory and Voting Systems
- Type
- article
- Field-Weighted Citation Impact
- 5.65
Funders
- Generalitat de Catalunya
- Agencia Estatal de Investigación