Scotus, Aquinas, & Radical Orthodoxy: Using the Law of Non-Contradiction to Reframe the Univocalist Debate

In this paper, I shall argue that the law of non-contradiction can be used to constructively reframe the univocalist debate. Duns Scotus argued famously that a term is univocal in two statements if its unity is sufficient for a contradiction. This logical definition was woven into his arguments against Henry of Ghent’s (and indirectly Thomas Aquinas’) view of analogy, arguing that all successful analogies must be built upon a univocal core. As early as the 1960s, this Scotist univocity had been singled out by French scholars and, by the turn of the century, had become the cherished whipping boy of Radical Orthodoxy, which claims that Scotus was the progenitor of modern onto-theology, nihilism, and secular immanence. While the genealogical critique in its fullness is beyond this paper’s scope, it illustrates the gravity of the question. If the doctrine of analogy is coherent—i.e., if Scotus turned to univocity without cause—then perhaps his condemnation is justified. However—in line with the principle quod est necessarium est licitum (that which is necessary is permissible)—if univocity is necessary for successful theological reference, then perhaps the doctrine of univocity can be defended regardless of its historical usage. This paper will argue that univocity is latent in all successful analogies, commencing with a fairly standard analysis of Scotus’ Ordinatio, then moving beyond Scotus to more constructively suggest that an expanded version of the argument from non-contradiction can help reframe the univocalist debate for today.