"(De)parting from the ways"

This paper explores Quentin Skinner's historiographical thesis, named linguistic contextualism, as a potential challenge to the dichotomy in contemporary philosophy between the ‘analytical’ and ‘continental’ traditions. This divide, rooted in differing approaches to language and methodology, has led to labeling and categorizing philosophers into these two areas. However, Skinner’s work, drawing on the ideas of R.G. Collingwood, Ludwig Wittgenstein, and John L. Austin, presents a nuanced view that defies easy classification. By emphasizing the importance of historical context and the ways language shapes philosophical inquiry, Skinner’s thesis blurs the boundaries between analytical and continental philosophy. We examine Skinner’s arguments and their implications for the ‘parting of ways’ concept, suggesting that linguistic contextualism challenges the validity of this dichotomy. Ultimately, it argues for the inclusion of linguistic contextualism as a significant alternative within contemporary philosophical discourse, particularly in discussions about metaphilosophy and the limitations of rigid categorizations.