Old tools for the new economy? Counterfactual causation in foreclosure assessment and choice of remedies on data-driven markets

Abstract Under the Digital Markets Act, gatekeeper platforms abide by numerous ex-ante rules, including narrow data-sharing obligations that address data-driven market tipping. Gatekeepers also remain subject to ex-post competition interventions. While interventions under both ex-ante and ex-post (antitrust) mandates are not novel, they must be approached with extra care in data-driven digital markets, where uncertainty and error costs are high. Therefore, we argue that post-DMA competition enforcement against gatekeepers requires rigorous ex-post economic effects analysis at two levels: foreclosure assessment and devising appropriate remedies. Regarding foreclosure assessment, we propose a ‘multiple-counterfactual-causation-test’ for establishing anticompetitive effects, which should ensure a nuanced analysis of the competitive landscape on data-driven digital markets in the post-DMA world. Regarding remedies, a fine-grained, proportionality-driven assessment of the need for ex-post data-related obligations is vital.

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Publication Details

Journal
Journal of Antitrust Enforcement
Published
2024-08-10
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1093/jaenfo/jnae042
Citations
1
Primary Topic
Digital Platforms and Economics
Type
article
Field-Weighted Citation Impact
0.55

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article

Old tools for the new economy? Counterfactual causation in foreclosure assessment and choice of remedies on data-driven markets

Zlatina Georgieva, Nora von Ingersleben‐Seip
1 citations
Journal of Antitrust Enforcement
Digital Platforms and Economics
0.55
article

Old tools for the new economy? Counterfactual causation in foreclosure assessment and choice of remedies on data-driven markets

Zlatina Georgieva, Nora von Ingersleben‐Seip
article en
1 citations

Abstract

Abstract Under the Digital Markets Act, gatekeeper platforms abide by numerous ex-ante rules, including narrow data-sharing obligations that address data-driven market tipping. Gatekeepers also remain subject to ex-post competition interventions. While interventions under both ex-ante and ex-post (antitrust) mandates are not novel, they must be approached with extra care in data-driven digital markets, where uncertainty and error costs are high. Therefore, we argue that post-DMA competition enforcement against gatekeepers requires rigorous ex-post economic effects analysis at two levels: foreclosure assessment and devising appropriate remedies. Regarding foreclosure assessment, we propose a ‘multiple-counterfactual-causation-test’ for establishing anticompetitive effects, which should ensure a nuanced analysis of the competitive landscape on data-driven digital markets in the post-DMA world. Regarding remedies, a fine-grained, proportionality-driven assessment of the need for ex-post data-related obligations is vital.

Journal of Antitrust EnforcementVol. 13(2)
University of Applied Sciences Utrecht (NL), Utrecht University (NL), Amsterdam University of Applied Sciences (NL), Technical University of Munich (DE), University of Amsterdam (NL)
European Commission, Universiteit van Amsterdam, Universiteit Utrecht
Partnerships for the goals
Openalex Percentile: Top 23%
Digital Platforms and Economics
0.55
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Old tools for the new economy? Counterfactual causation in foreclosure assessment and choice of remedies on data-driven markets — Zlatina Georgieva, Nora von Ingersleben‐Seip · Journal of Antitrust Enforcement (2024) | TGRS Research Map | TGRS