Dynamic decisions of the manufacturer-led closed-loop supply chain considering altruistic behavior in EV battery

Behavioral studies have found that altruism can affect the decision of Closed-Loop Supply Chain (CLSC) significantly. Altruistic behaviors on optimal decision-making in dynamic environments are challenging problems. To solve these difficulties, we individually propose three types of cases and using differential game theory and Bellman theory: (a) a manufacturer behaving altruistically to third-party recyclers; (b) one manufacturer cooperating with other participants to have altruism; (c) the manufacturer collaborating with other participants to behave non-altruistically. We conduct optimal dynamic decisions for participants associated with quality of EV batteries, further explore the rule of time evolution considering altruistic behavior. We find three interesting results as follows: altruistic behavior of the manufacturer is advantageous to profitability of CLSC especially when it cooperates with a retailer and one of third-party recyclers. Altruistic behavior of the manufacturer is a behavior of “profit transferring” and moderate altruistic behavior is conducive to the profitability of CLSC and cooperation motivates activity of recycling. In dynamic situations, quality level of EV batteries is polarized. When the manufacturer has altruistic behavior to one or two third-party recyclers, long-term development of CLSC is affected by the deterioration of quality level of EV batteries. • We observe an optimal dynamic model of manufacturer-led CLSC considering altruistic behavior in EV battery. • We have to make trade-off between the optimal profit of CLSC system and recycling rate. • When the manufacturer behaves altruistically to the third-party recycler 2 with other participants has higher total profit than all of them are in a coalition without altruistic behavior.