How to Do Without Encroachment
Abstract This paper defends a version of epistemic contextualism that accounts for the ordinary judgements and theoretical principles that motivate pragmatic encroachment. Adopting this contextualist view, we can avoid the counterintuitive consequences of pragmatic encroachment, while still preserving its attractive applications.
Authors
- Sarah Moss (ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0001-7938-1800)
Institutions
- University of Michigan (US)
Publication Details
- Journal
- Mind
- Published
- 2024-08-12
- DOI
- https://doi.org/10.1093/mind/fzae029
- Primary Topic
- Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics
- Type
- article
- Field-Weighted Citation Impact
- 0.00