Analysing policy success and failure in Australia: Pink batts and set‐top boxes

Abstract This article examines two Australian government programs from the Rudd/Gillard Labor government, the Home Insulation Program (HIP) and the Digital Switchover Household Assistance Scheme (HAS). Both became shibboleths of the Labor government's perceived waste and incompetence. Using key informant interviews and documents obtained under freedom of information (FOI), I analyse these programs against the multiple ‘dimensions’ of success proposed by Newman and common narrative frames around programme failure. I argue that the HAS was broadly successful across most dimensions of success, notwithstanding the adverse media attention. The study identifies four key factors driving HIP's failure: scheme design, installer training, demand control, and departmental expertise. All of these came back to the timeline pressures, driven by conflicting priorities, which in turn gave the Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet (PM&C) more influence than would usually be the case. In comparison, HAS's success is attributed to crucial design choices, like the phased rollout and head contractor model. The article identifies the danger of ignoring subject matter expertise and poor policy/Cabinet processes, which have been reinforced by the recent Royal Commission into the Robodebt Scheme. Points for practitioners Demand‐driven programmes need to have demand‐side control techniques built into them. The role of central agencies needs to be carefully considered, particularly in relation to areas that are not their expertise, such as detailed programme development and implementation. Lessons about poor policy and Cabinet processes, as well as cultural change from the Pink Batts Royal Commission, do not appear to have been sufficiently embedded in the culture of the APS, as there are ongoing echoes of the same problems evident in the Robodebt Royal Commission.