Procreative Obligations and the Directed Duty of Care

ABSTRACT There is much dispute about what we owe the children we are responsible for creating. Some argue that so long as we provide offspring with lives worth living we do no wrong. Others argue that our procreative obligations are weightier and oblige us to provide (or attempt to provide) our offspring with a reasonable opportunity to thrive, or meet some other standard beyond merely providing a life worth living. Our practices and intuitions on this matter are inconsistent. For example, gamete donors who intentionally participate in the project of creating a child are thought to have few obligations to their offspring, but those who create a child accidentally are thought to have weighty obligations. Furthermore, a justification for why we are obliged to provide offspring with more than a life worth living has been elusive. To resolve this puzzle I argue that an under‐theorized element of morality, the directed duty of care, explains why we owe our offspring more than a life worth living.