The Real 'Hard Problem' of Consciousness: Where Do Thoughts Come From, if Not the Brain?

This article argues that contemporary debates of the 'hard problem' of consciousness (i.e.how does 'mindless' matter produce 'matterless' mind?) cannot be resolved through philosophical analysis alone and need to be anchored to a comprehensive empirical foundation that includes psychophysiological research of psychosomatic phenomena and exceptional human experience. First, alternative perspectives on the mind–matter question and reasons why traditional formulations of the 'hard problem' have been so difficult to resolve are reviewed. Empirical evidence of mind modulation of bodily systems and its implications for the classical quantitative–qualitative distinction and construct of causal closure are then considered. A novel theory that combines bottom-up (panpsychism) and top-down (non-theistic panenpsychism) approaches relating physical processes to mental activity is then proposed that has practical implications for conceiving and exploring alternatives to current ways of thinking about the mind–matter question.