Problems for Selection Problems: Comments on Wayne Wu's Movements of the Mind

Early in Movements of the Mind , Wayne Wu puts forth a foundational picture of action. On this picture, intentional action is necessarily a solution to a selection problem, a problem of choice among multiple causally possible alternatives. Forming an intention solves one selection problem; acting on that intention requires solving yet further selection problems about how to execute that intention. There are two serious issues with this picture of action. First: some intentional actions are causally necessitated. They can't be solutions to selection problems. Wu's argument for this claim, which contrasts reflex with action, does not succeed in showing that action must solve a selection problem — nor that reflex does not solve such a problem. Second: the requirement to solve further selection problems while acting on an intention leads to a vicious regress that threatens the possibility of action in general. If these two issues are addressed, Wu's groundbreaking scientific approach to mental action might offer us a powerful new theory of ongoing causal control over intentional action.

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Publication Details

Journal
Journal of Consciousness Studies
Published
2024-08-01
DOI
https://doi.org/10.53765/20512201.31.7.127
Primary Topic
Psychology of Moral and Emotional Judgment
Type
article
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article

Problems for Selection Problems: Comments on Wayne Wu's Movements of the Mind

Antonia Peacocke
Journal of Consciousness Studies
Psychology of Moral and Emotional Judgment
article

Problems for Selection Problems: Comments on Wayne Wu's Movements of the Mind

Antonia Peacocke
article en

Abstract

Early in Movements of the Mind , Wayne Wu puts forth a foundational picture of action. On this picture, intentional action is necessarily a solution to a selection problem, a problem of choice among multiple causally possible alternatives. Forming an intention solves one selection problem; acting on that intention requires solving yet further selection problems about how to execute that intention. There are two serious issues with this picture of action. First: some intentional actions are causally necessitated. They can't be solutions to selection problems. Wu's argument for this claim, which contrasts reflex with action, does not succeed in showing that action must solve a selection problem — nor that reflex does not solve such a problem. Second: the requirement to solve further selection problems while acting on an intention leads to a vicious regress that threatens the possibility of action in general. If these two issues are addressed, Wu's groundbreaking scientific approach to mental action might offer us a powerful new theory of ongoing causal control over intentional action.

Journal of Consciousness StudiesVol. 31(7)
Stanford University (US)
Peace, Justice and strong institutions
Openalex Percentile: Top 87%
Psychology of Moral and Emotional Judgment
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