Mechanisms for the Evolution of a MultipleGovernance Model: Evidence from WaterPollution Control in the Erhai LakeTourism Environment in China

Starting from the perspective of multiple governance, we put the central government, the local governments, and tourism enterprises in the same analytical framework, regard local residents as the external supervisory force of the water pollution management process, construct a tripartite game model of water pollution management in the tourism environment of Erhai Lake in China by using the evolutionary game method, solve the model and discuss the equilibrium of the game, and further simulate and analyze the impacts of the relevant parameters on the game system by using MATLAB.It is found that: (1) the stronger the allocation of special funds for environmental protection, the more it can promote the positive governance of the local governments.However, at the same time, when the local governments are negatively governed, the value of the administrative penalty imposed by the central government on the local governments is too small to form a deterrent effect, and the pressure of the administrative penalty is too high to weaken the confidence of the local government, so the central government needs to be moderate in the administrative penalty imposed on the local officials.(2) The higher the proportion of local government environmental protection special funds allocated to tourism enterprises, the more they can promote the reduction of emissions by tourism enterprises, and their incentive to reduce emissions will be strengthened when the main business income of tourism enterprises increases due to the improvement of the tourism environment.(3) Local residents can influence the environmental behavior of the central government, the local governments, and tourism enterprises through the reputational feedback mechanism, which can promote the treatment of water pollution in the tourism environment.(4) The collection of environmental tax by the local government can motivate tourism enterprises to reduce emissions, but the environmental tax rate should be set at [0,3.5], and if it is too high, tourism enterprises will lose confidence in reducing emissions.

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Publication Details

Journal
Polish Journal of Environmental Studies
Published
2024-08-05
DOI
https://doi.org/10.15244/pjoes/186646
Citations
1
Primary Topic
Energy, Environment, Economic Growth
Type
article
Field-Weighted Citation Impact
1.13
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article

Mechanisms for the Evolution of a MultipleGovernance Model: Evidence from WaterPollution Control in the Erhai LakeTourism Environment in China

Shu Fang, Bao Feng
1 citations
Polish Journal of Environmental Studies
Energy, Environment, Economic Growth
1.13
article

Mechanisms for the Evolution of a MultipleGovernance Model: Evidence from WaterPollution Control in the Erhai LakeTourism Environment in China

Shu Fang, Bao Feng
article en
1 citations

Abstract

Starting from the perspective of multiple governance, we put the central government, the local governments, and tourism enterprises in the same analytical framework, regard local residents as the external supervisory force of the water pollution management process, construct a tripartite game model of water pollution management in the tourism environment of Erhai Lake in China by using the evolutionary game method, solve the model and discuss the equilibrium of the game, and further simulate and analyze the impacts of the relevant parameters on the game system by using MATLAB.It is found that: (1) the stronger the allocation of special funds for environmental protection, the more it can promote the positive governance of the local governments.However, at the same time, when the local governments are negatively governed, the value of the administrative penalty imposed by the central government on the local governments is too small to form a deterrent effect, and the pressure of the administrative penalty is too high to weaken the confidence of the local government, so the central government needs to be moderate in the administrative penalty imposed on the local officials.(2) The higher the proportion of local government environmental protection special funds allocated to tourism enterprises, the more they can promote the reduction of emissions by tourism enterprises, and their incentive to reduce emissions will be strengthened when the main business income of tourism enterprises increases due to the improvement of the tourism environment.(3) Local residents can influence the environmental behavior of the central government, the local governments, and tourism enterprises through the reputational feedback mechanism, which can promote the treatment of water pollution in the tourism environment.(4) The collection of environmental tax by the local government can motivate tourism enterprises to reduce emissions, but the environmental tax rate should be set at [0,3.5], and if it is too high, tourism enterprises will lose confidence in reducing emissions.

Polish Journal of Environmental StudiesVol. 34(1)
Guangxi University (CN)
Openalex Percentile: Top 12%
Energy, Environment, Economic Growth
1.13
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