Historiosophy of law: synthesis of disciplines or independent questioning?

The article examines the question of the essence of historiosophy as a cognitive discipline. As a result, it was found out that its capabilities are realized not by synthesizing subjects of different sciences (history, philosophy and law), but through an autonomous and self-sufficient range of issues with metaphysical origin and noospheric content. We are talking about a semantic area where the law is considered from the position of “was”, and not “yesterday”. In this regard, they ask: was there a right to “was” and is it still capable of being “was”? The likeness found in his life is evaluated on the subject of whether it was a moment, a passing illusion, or perhaps even “nothing” at all? Or was the grasped “was” itself a being that originated in the past, but has not gone anywhere and has a continuation in existence? As a result, it turns out that in law it leads to “historical transience”, and what in it ensures its “non-historical presence” in being. The study also showed that the main and structurally forming category of historiosophy is time, which is rarely thought about in modern jurisprudence. Jurisprudence is mainly concerned with periods, gaps and deadlines, rather than time per se. The omission of time and knowledge about it left jurisprudence standing on the absolutist and abstract concept of Newton, which never reproduced ideas about time based on reality. The theory played with the physical side of time and missed its socio-psychological dimension, that is, that life is the main vessel of time, the only source of its filling and the key means of exhaustion. The life of atoms, as well as the life of legal goods, is not only the source of their existence, but also the duration of this existence. In turn, time is a fundamental criterion for the viability of legal benefits.