Games Played by Exponential Weights Algorithms

This paper studies the last-iterate convergence properties of the exponential weights algorithm with constant learning rates. We consider a repeated interaction in discrete time, where each player uses an exponential weights algorithm characterized by an initial mixed action and a fixed learning rate so that the mixed action profile [Formula: see text] played at stage t follows an homogeneous Markov chain. At first, we show that the probability to play a strict Nash equilibrium at the next stage converges almost surely to zero or one. Second, we show that the limit of [Formula: see text], whenever it exists, belongs to the set of Nash equilibria with equalizing payoffs. Finally, we show that in strong coordination games, where the payoff of a player is positive on the diagonal and zero elsewhere, [Formula: see text] converges almost surely to one of the strict Nash equilibria. Funding: This research benefited from financial support from the AI Institute Artificial and Natural Intelligence Toulouse Institute (ANITI) [Grants ANR-19-PI3A-0004 and ANR-23-IACL-P0002] and the ANR Chess [Grant ANR-17-EURE-0010]. J. Renault acknowledges funding from the Agence nationale de la recherche (ANR) [Grant MaSDOL-19-CE23-0017-01].

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Publication Details

Journal
Mathematics of Operations Research
Published
2026-11-16
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1287/moor.2025.1310
Primary Topic
Game Theory and Applications
Type
article
Field-Weighted Citation Impact
0.00

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article

Games Played by Exponential Weights Algorithms

Fabien Gensbittel, Jérôme Renault, Maurizio d'Andrea
Mathematics of Operations Research
Game Theory and Applications
article

Games Played by Exponential Weights Algorithms

Fabien Gensbittel, Jérôme Renault, Maurizio d'Andrea
article en

Abstract

This paper studies the last-iterate convergence properties of the exponential weights algorithm with constant learning rates. We consider a repeated interaction in discrete time, where each player uses an exponential weights algorithm characterized by an initial mixed action and a fixed learning rate so that the mixed action profile [Formula: see text] played at stage t follows an homogeneous Markov chain. At first, we show that the probability to play a strict Nash equilibrium at the next stage converges almost surely to zero or one. Second, we show that the limit of [Formula: see text], whenever it exists, belongs to the set of Nash equilibria with equalizing payoffs. Finally, we show that in strong coordination games, where the payoff of a player is positive on the diagonal and zero elsewhere, [Formula: see text] converges almost surely to one of the strict Nash equilibria. Funding: This research benefited from financial support from the AI Institute Artificial and Natural Intelligence Toulouse Institute (ANITI) [Grants ANR-19-PI3A-0004 and ANR-23-IACL-P0002] and the ANR Chess [Grant ANR-17-EURE-0010]. J. Renault acknowledges funding from the Agence nationale de la recherche (ANR) [Grant MaSDOL-19-CE23-0017-01].

Mathematics of Operations Research
National University of Singapore (SG), Toulouse School of Economics (FR), Université de Toulouse (FR), Université Toulouse Capitole (FR), Toulouse School of Economics Research (FR), Libera Università Internazionale degli Studi Sociali Guido Carli (IT)
Agence Nationale de la Recherche
Game Theory and Applications
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