Partisan Banks and Creditor Coordination Within Loan Syndicates

ABSTRACT We investigate how firm‐level partisanship influences interactions between banks in the syndicated loan market. Because politically divergent banks hold conflicting perceptions of economic conditions, ideological distance between banks impedes consensus and elevates expected coordination costs. We find that greater political distance between a lead arranger and a participant reduces the participant's likelihood of joining a syndicate and lowers its retained loan share relative to the lead. The relation between political distance and loan share differences intensifies during periods of high national political polarization. Moreover, greater political diversity within a syndicate is associated with less restrictive loan covenants and higher interest spreads, reflecting a trade‐off where lenders sacrifice contingent control to avoid costly renegotiation gridlock. Validating our disagreement mechanism, we show that following presidential elections, banks politically misaligned with the incoming administration issue significantly more pessimistic macroeconomic forecasts than aligned banks.

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Publication Details

Journal
Journal of Accounting Research
Published
2026-11-16
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1111/1475-679x.70097
Citations
2
Primary Topic
Political Influence and Corporate Strategies
Type
article
Field-Weighted Citation Impact
2.48
Controls
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article

Partisan Banks and Creditor Coordination Within Loan Syndicates

Jianxin Zhao, Robert M. Bushman, Sang Woo Sohn
2 citations
Journal of Accounting Research
Political Influence and Corporate Strategies
2.48
article

Partisan Banks and Creditor Coordination Within Loan Syndicates

Jianxin Zhao, Robert M. Bushman, Sang Woo Sohn
article en
2 citations

Abstract

ABSTRACT We investigate how firm‐level partisanship influences interactions between banks in the syndicated loan market. Because politically divergent banks hold conflicting perceptions of economic conditions, ideological distance between banks impedes consensus and elevates expected coordination costs. We find that greater political distance between a lead arranger and a participant reduces the participant's likelihood of joining a syndicate and lowers its retained loan share relative to the lead. The relation between political distance and loan share differences intensifies during periods of high national political polarization. Moreover, greater political diversity within a syndicate is associated with less restrictive loan covenants and higher interest spreads, reflecting a trade‐off where lenders sacrifice contingent control to avoid costly renegotiation gridlock. Validating our disagreement mechanism, we show that following presidential elections, banks politically misaligned with the incoming administration issue significantly more pessimistic macroeconomic forecasts than aligned banks.

Journal of Accounting Research
Emory University (US), City University of Hong Kong (HK)
Peace, justice, and strong institutions
Openalex Percentile: Top 16%
Political Influence and Corporate Strategies
2.48
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