On the (In)Efficiency of Sustainability-Linked Loans

Problem definition: Sustainability-linked loans (SLLs) are designed to reward firms with cheaper financing when sustainability performance targets (SPTs) are met. Yet empirical evidence shows no meaningful interest rate reductions, mixed sustainability outcomes, and participation concentrated among firms with low ESG risk. Regulators have criticized weak financial incentives and questioned whether targets are sufficiently ambitious. If SLLs neither lower borrowing costs nor reliably improve sustainability, how do they actually operate, what limits their effectiveness, and how should they be designed to achieve efficient sustainability while remaining viable in competitive credit markets? Methodology/results: We develop a production–financing model in which sustainability investments increase consumer willingness to pay but must be financed under credit-risk premiums. We show that standard SLLs function through coercive enforcement rather than discounted capital: banks set ambitious SPTs backed by penalty rates that redirect all borrower surplus toward sustainability without lowering borrowing costs. This mechanism explains the absence of rate reductions and the increase in loan sizes. However, it creates a viability concern. When firms can access ordinary loans that preserve positive profit, they choose not to participate in SLLs. The sustainability advantage of standard SLLs thus collapses under competition—rationalizing selective adoption and limited impact. Government subsidies can restore participation but introduce calibration risk because subsidies and SPTs are determined separately. We propose refined SLLs that integrate enforcement with financing-friction mitigation via target-contingent rebates. Refined SLLs implement the highest sustainability level supported by consumer willingness to pay while preserving competitive viability. They dominate standard SLLs when financing frictions are severe and outperform subsidized SLLs when subsidies are not precisely aligned with financing frictions. Managerial implications: Effective sustainability-linked finance depends not on nominal interest discounts but on coordinated contract design that jointly secures commitment, preserves participation, and aligns financing costs with economically efficient sustainability investment.

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Publication Details

Journal
Manufacturing & Service Operations Management
Published
2026-11-19
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1287/msom.2026.0230
Citations
4
Primary Topic
Sustainable Finance and Green Bonds
Type
article
Field-Weighted Citation Impact
2.57
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article

On the (In)Efficiency of Sustainability-Linked Loans

Guoming Lai, Vernon Ning Hsu, Guitian Liang, Yang Li
4 citations
Manufacturing & Service Operations Management
Sustainable Finance and Green Bonds
2.57
article

On the (In)Efficiency of Sustainability-Linked Loans

Guoming Lai, Vernon Ning Hsu, Guitian Liang, Yang Li
article en
4 citations

Abstract

Problem definition: Sustainability-linked loans (SLLs) are designed to reward firms with cheaper financing when sustainability performance targets (SPTs) are met. Yet empirical evidence shows no meaningful interest rate reductions, mixed sustainability outcomes, and participation concentrated among firms with low ESG risk. Regulators have criticized weak financial incentives and questioned whether targets are sufficiently ambitious. If SLLs neither lower borrowing costs nor reliably improve sustainability, how do they actually operate, what limits their effectiveness, and how should they be designed to achieve efficient sustainability while remaining viable in competitive credit markets? Methodology/results: We develop a production–financing model in which sustainability investments increase consumer willingness to pay but must be financed under credit-risk premiums. We show that standard SLLs function through coercive enforcement rather than discounted capital: banks set ambitious SPTs backed by penalty rates that redirect all borrower surplus toward sustainability without lowering borrowing costs. This mechanism explains the absence of rate reductions and the increase in loan sizes. However, it creates a viability concern. When firms can access ordinary loans that preserve positive profit, they choose not to participate in SLLs. The sustainability advantage of standard SLLs thus collapses under competition—rationalizing selective adoption and limited impact. Government subsidies can restore participation but introduce calibration risk because subsidies and SPTs are determined separately. We propose refined SLLs that integrate enforcement with financing-friction mitigation via target-contingent rebates. Refined SLLs implement the highest sustainability level supported by consumer willingness to pay while preserving competitive viability. They dominate standard SLLs when financing frictions are severe and outperform subsidized SLLs when subsidies are not precisely aligned with financing frictions. Managerial implications: Effective sustainability-linked finance depends not on nominal interest discounts but on coordinated contract design that jointly secures commitment, preserves participation, and aligns financing costs with economically efficient sustainability investment.

Manufacturing & Service Operations Management
Western University (CA), Jinan University (CN), Chinese University of Hong Kong (HK), Ivey Business School (CA), The University of Texas at Austin (US)
Responsible consumption and production
Openalex Percentile: Top 16%
Sustainable Finance and Green Bonds
2.57
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