The political benefits of the monoculture: Estimating the electoral effect of the market facilitation program

Does the distribution of government transfers affect elections? We analyze a natural experiment in the 2019 wave of the US Department of Agriculture's Market Facilitation Program (MFP). The 2019 MFP allocated $14.5 billion via a formula combining historical production data and commodity-specific trade damages. We show how a methodological quirk resulted in arbitrary variation in these damages that propagated through the formula into excessive county-level compensation rates. We estimate the effects of this payment shock using a novel, design-based, randomization inference approach to account for complex dependencies across US counties. We find that counties receiving greater compensation rates, on average, have higher two-party Republican presidential vote shares in the 2020 election. Instrumenting for actual 2019 MFP disbursements, we find an additional $1 million in payments to a county increased that county's 2020 two-party Trump vote share by about .18 percentage points on average. Had the 2019 MFP maintained the spending levels of the 2018 wave, we estimate that Candidate Trump's two-party vote share would have been .117 percentage points lower nationally, with particularly pronounced effects in swing states like Arizona (.41 percentage points) and Georgia (.159 percentage points).

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Publication Details

Journal
Journal of Public Economics
Published
2026-07-28
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jpubeco.2026.105742
Citations
1
Primary Topic
Political Influence and Corporate Strategies
Type
article
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article

The political benefits of the monoculture: Estimating the electoral effect of the market facilitation program

Anton Strezhnev, Robert Gulotty
1 citations
Journal of Public Economics
Political Influence and Corporate Strategies
article

The political benefits of the monoculture: Estimating the electoral effect of the market facilitation program

Anton Strezhnev, Robert Gulotty
article en
1 citations

Abstract

Does the distribution of government transfers affect elections? We analyze a natural experiment in the 2019 wave of the US Department of Agriculture's Market Facilitation Program (MFP). The 2019 MFP allocated $14.5 billion via a formula combining historical production data and commodity-specific trade damages. We show how a methodological quirk resulted in arbitrary variation in these damages that propagated through the formula into excessive county-level compensation rates. We estimate the effects of this payment shock using a novel, design-based, randomization inference approach to account for complex dependencies across US counties. We find that counties receiving greater compensation rates, on average, have higher two-party Republican presidential vote shares in the 2020 election. Instrumenting for actual 2019 MFP disbursements, we find an additional $1 million in payments to a county increased that county's 2020 two-party Trump vote share by about .18 percentage points on average. Had the 2019 MFP maintained the spending levels of the 2018 wave, we estimate that Candidate Trump's two-party vote share would have been .117 percentage points lower nationally, with particularly pronounced effects in swing states like Arizona (.41 percentage points) and Georgia (.159 percentage points).

Journal of Public EconomicsVol. 261
University of Wisconsin–Madison (US), University of Chicago (US)
Zero hunger
Openalex Percentile: Top 100%
Political Influence and Corporate Strategies
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