Loose knots: Strong versus weak commitments to save for education in Uganda
Commitment devices offer an opportunity to restrict future choices. However, strict commitments may deter participation. Using a school-based commitment savings program for children to save for educational expenses in Uganda, we compare an account fully committed to school expenses to an account with a weaker commitment (funds withdrawn in cash, rather than a voucher). Children save more in the weaker commitment treatment arm, and when combined with parental outreach spend more on educational supplies and score 0.10 standard deviations (standard error = 0.04) on test scores. The fully committed account yields no such educational improvements, and neither account finds impacts on secondary or downstream outcomes such as attendance, enrollment, or non-cognitive skills.
Authors
- Dean Karlan (ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0003-0164-1398)
- Leigh Linden (ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0003-2180-6524)
Institutions
- Center for Economic and Policy Research (US)
- The University of Texas at Austin (US)
Publication Details
- Journal
- Journal of Development Economics
- Published
- 2024-12-27
- DOI
- https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jdeveco.2024.103444
- Citations
- 3
- Primary Topic
- Poverty, Education, and Child Welfare
- Type
- article
- Field-Weighted Citation Impact
- 0.53