EXPRESS: Slim Shading in Ad Auctions: Adjustment of Bidding Strategies to First-Price Rules

We study how bidders adjusted to a switch from second-price to first-price auction rules on a large online advertising exchange. Under first-price rules, bidders should strategically reduce (“shade”) their bids. To assess whether observed bid reductions were sufficient given the competition each bidder faced, we develop a nonparametric estimator of a lower bound on the valuation underlying each bid. The estimator relies on localized measures of competition and does not require assumptions of bidder symmetry, valuation independence, or equilibrium bidding. Applying the method to more than 40 million auctions involving eight major demand-side platforms, we find pervasive insufficient bid shading after the switch. The implied lower bounds on valuations remain substantially above pre-switch levels for at least three months after the transition, indicating that none of the bidders we study shaded sufficiently. This finding is robust to alternative definitions of local competition, richer conditioning information, and variations in the assumptions underlying the estimator. The results suggest that adjustment to major auction-design changes can be surprisingly slow even among sophisticated algorithmic bidders, with implications for marketplace design and the interpretation of short-run “A/B test” experiments.

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Publication Details

Journal
Journal of Marketing Research
Published
2026-11-16
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1177/00222437261511019
Citations
5
Primary Topic
Auction Theory and Applications
Type
article
Field-Weighted Citation Impact
7.23
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article

EXPRESS: Slim Shading in Ad Auctions: Adjustment of Bidding Strategies to First-Price Rules

Robert Zeithammer, Miguel Alcobendas
5 citations
Journal of Marketing Research
Auction Theory and Applications
7.23
article

EXPRESS: Slim Shading in Ad Auctions: Adjustment of Bidding Strategies to First-Price Rules

Robert Zeithammer, Miguel Alcobendas
article en
5 citations

Abstract

We study how bidders adjusted to a switch from second-price to first-price auction rules on a large online advertising exchange. Under first-price rules, bidders should strategically reduce (“shade”) their bids. To assess whether observed bid reductions were sufficient given the competition each bidder faced, we develop a nonparametric estimator of a lower bound on the valuation underlying each bid. The estimator relies on localized measures of competition and does not require assumptions of bidder symmetry, valuation independence, or equilibrium bidding. Applying the method to more than 40 million auctions involving eight major demand-side platforms, we find pervasive insufficient bid shading after the switch. The implied lower bounds on valuations remain substantially above pre-switch levels for at least three months after the transition, indicating that none of the bidders we study shaded sufficiently. This finding is robust to alternative definitions of local competition, richer conditioning information, and variations in the assumptions underlying the estimator. The results suggest that adjustment to major auction-design changes can be surprisingly slow even among sophisticated algorithmic bidders, with implications for marketplace design and the interpretation of short-run “A/B test” experiments.

Journal of Marketing Research
University of California, Los Angeles (US), Yahoo (United States) (US)
Openalex Percentile: Top 4%
Auction Theory and Applications
7.23
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