Labor Associations: The Blue Wall of Silence
ABSTRACT We present a model showing that when the demand for labor services is inelastic and individual behavior is imperfectly monitored, a firm's employees may prefer to protect its shirkers and conceal information about peers' performance from the firm.
Authors
- Andrea Mattozzi
- Salvatore Modica (ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-9488-4497)
- David Levine
Institutions
- Royal Holloway University of London (GB)
- Washington University in St. Louis (US)
- University of Palermo (IT)
- University of Bologna (IT)
Publication Details
- Journal
- International Economic Review
- Published
- 2026-08-25
- DOI
- https://doi.org/10.1111/iere.70098
- Primary Topic
- Labor Movements and Unions
- Type
- article
- Field-Weighted Citation Impact
- 0.00
Funders
- Ministero dell’Istruzione, dell’Università e della Ricerca