Behind the Veil of Cultural Persistence: Marriage and Divorce in a Migrant Community

Abstract Arranged marriage with a spouse chosen in the country of origin is a persisting practice in many migrant communities. In this context, rather than being imposed by migrant parents on children, an arranged marriage is the outcome of a negotiation between them. Parents see this type of marriage as a vector of transmission of their identity to the next generation. Children resist because they are concerned about mutual compatibility with their future spouse. Then, paradoxically, the possibility of divorce can increase the appeal of arranged marriages, by convincing young adults to accept the compromise with their parents. This is particularly true for women for whom divorce is the only possible exit out of a failed marriage (when men can entertain extra-marital affairs without social disapproval). To test these intuitions, we exploit a change in the divorce law in Belgium (introduction of no-fault divorce in 2007). On the basis of two unique sets of data on descendants of Turkish migrants (second-generation men and women), we find that the effect of this legal change on the incidence of arranged marriages (with an ‘imported spouse’) and divorce differs between women and men. The propensity to choose an arranged marriage (and to divorce) is decreased for second-generation men relative to women.

Authors

Institutions

Publication Details

Journal
The Economic Journal
Published
2025-08-15
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1093/ej/ueaf072
Citations
2
Primary Topic
Migration and Labor Dynamics
Type
article
Field-Weighted Citation Impact
4.20
Controls
|||
ALL TIME
JAN
FEB
MAR
APR
MAY
JUN
JUL
AUG
SEP
OCT
article

Behind the Veil of Cultural Persistence: Marriage and Divorce in a Migrant Community

Jean‐Philippe Platteau, Zaki Wahhaj, Catherine Guirkinger
2 citations
The Economic Journal
Migration and Labor Dynamics
4.20
article

Behind the Veil of Cultural Persistence: Marriage and Divorce in a Migrant Community

Jean‐Philippe Platteau, Zaki Wahhaj, Catherine Guirkinger
article en
2 citations

Abstract

Abstract Arranged marriage with a spouse chosen in the country of origin is a persisting practice in many migrant communities. In this context, rather than being imposed by migrant parents on children, an arranged marriage is the outcome of a negotiation between them. Parents see this type of marriage as a vector of transmission of their identity to the next generation. Children resist because they are concerned about mutual compatibility with their future spouse. Then, paradoxically, the possibility of divorce can increase the appeal of arranged marriages, by convincing young adults to accept the compromise with their parents. This is particularly true for women for whom divorce is the only possible exit out of a failed marriage (when men can entertain extra-marital affairs without social disapproval). To test these intuitions, we exploit a change in the divorce law in Belgium (introduction of no-fault divorce in 2007). On the basis of two unique sets of data on descendants of Turkish migrants (second-generation men and women), we find that the effect of this legal change on the incidence of arranged marriages (with an ‘imported spouse’) and divorce differs between women and men. The propensity to choose an arranged marriage (and to divorce) is decreased for second-generation men relative to women.

The Economic JournalVol. 136(674)
University of Namur (BE), King's College London (GB)
Gender equality
Openalex Percentile: Top 10%
Migration and Labor Dynamics
4.20
AI Navigator

Ask Laika to Summarize, Analyze, and Connect papers live on the map.

Summarize Papers & Methodologies

Extract key findings, datasets, and comparative methods across publications.

Benchmark Rankings & Visual Analytics

Rank top research institutions, authors, funders, topics, and journals by Field-Weighted Citation Impact (FWCI) and paper volume with instant charts.

Connect Distant Disciplines

Bridge topological clusters on the map to find hidden collaborative intersections.