Continuum Nash bargaining solutions

Abstract We compute a mean field limit of Nash bargaining solutions with agents chosen from a smooth probability density and with utility determined by the negative exponential of a cost function. When the cost function has the property that Kantorovich potentials are unique, we show that both at finite stages and in the continuum limit, Nash bargaining solutions can be described by a solution to an optimal transport problem. Nash’s classical bargaining solution suggests that N players in a non-cooperative bargaining situation should find a solution that maximizes the product of each player’s utility functions. In our special case, the maximization problem becomes an optimal transport type problem, where the target density is the minimizer to the functional $$ F(\beta )=H_{\nu }(\beta )+C(\mu ,\beta ) $$ <mml:math xmlns:mml="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML"> <mml:mrow> <mml:mi>F</mml:mi> <mml:mrow> <mml:mo>(</mml:mo> <mml:mi>β</mml:mi> <mml:mo>)</mml:mo> </mml:mrow> <mml:mo>=</mml:mo> <mml:msub> <mml:mi>H</mml:mi> <mml:mi>ν</mml:mi> </mml:msub> <mml:mrow> <mml:mo>(</mml:mo> <mml:mi>β</mml:mi> <mml:mo>)</mml:mo> </mml:mrow> <mml:mo>+</mml:mo> <mml:mi>C</mml:mi> <mml:mrow> <mml:mo>(</mml:mo> <mml:mi>μ</mml:mi> <mml:mo>,</mml:mo> <mml:mi>β</mml:mi> <mml:mo>)</mml:mo> </mml:mrow> </mml:mrow> </mml:math> where $$H_{\nu }(\beta )$$ <mml:math xmlns:mml="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML"> <mml:mrow> <mml:msub> <mml:mi>H</mml:mi> <mml:mi>ν</mml:mi> </mml:msub> <mml:mrow> <mml:mo>(</mml:mo> <mml:mi>β</mml:mi> <mml:mo>)</mml:mo> </mml:mrow> </mml:mrow> </mml:math> is the relative entropy and $$C(\mu ,\nu )$$ <mml:math xmlns:mml="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML"> <mml:mrow> <mml:mi>C</mml:mi> <mml:mo>(</mml:mo> <mml:mi>μ</mml:mi> <mml:mo>,</mml:mo> <mml:mi>ν</mml:mi> <mml:mo>)</mml:mo> </mml:mrow> </mml:math> is the optimal transport distance. This minimization problem is also solved in the Jordan-Kinderlehrer-Otto scheme. We also show that for compact metric spaces, when c is a Lipschitz cost function, even in the presence of non-unique Kantorovich potentials, the solution the minimization problem has Lipschitz Radon-Nikodym derivative.

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Journal
Nonlinear Differential Equations and Applications NoDEA
Published
2025-08-09
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1007/s00030-025-01118-7
Citations
1
Primary Topic
Markov Chains and Monte Carlo Methods
Type
article
Field-Weighted Citation Impact
0.00

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article

Continuum Nash bargaining solutions

Micah Warren
1 citations
Nonlinear Differential Equations and Applications NoDEA
Markov Chains and Monte Carlo Methods
article

Continuum Nash bargaining solutions

Micah Warren
article en
1 citations

Abstract

Abstract We compute a mean field limit of Nash bargaining solutions with agents chosen from a smooth probability density and with utility determined by the negative exponential of a cost function. When the cost function has the property that Kantorovich potentials are unique, we show that both at finite stages and in the continuum limit, Nash bargaining solutions can be described by a solution to an optimal transport problem. Nash’s classical bargaining solution suggests that N players in a non-cooperative bargaining situation should find a solution that maximizes the product of each player’s utility functions. In our special case, the maximization problem becomes an optimal transport type problem, where the target density is the minimizer to the functional $$ F(\beta )=H_{\nu }(\beta )+C(\mu ,\beta ) $$ <mml:math xmlns:mml="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML"> <mml:mrow> <mml:mi>F</mml:mi> <mml:mrow> <mml:mo>(</mml:mo> <mml:mi>β</mml:mi> <mml:mo>)</mml:mo> </mml:mrow> <mml:mo>=</mml:mo> <mml:msub> <mml:mi>H</mml:mi> <mml:mi>ν</mml:mi> </mml:msub> <mml:mrow> <mml:mo>(</mml:mo> <mml:mi>β</mml:mi> <mml:mo>)</mml:mo> </mml:mrow> <mml:mo>+</mml:mo> <mml:mi>C</mml:mi> <mml:mrow> <mml:mo>(</mml:mo> <mml:mi>μ</mml:mi> <mml:mo>,</mml:mo> <mml:mi>β</mml:mi> <mml:mo>)</mml:mo> </mml:mrow> </mml:mrow> </mml:math> where $$H_{\nu }(\beta )$$ <mml:math xmlns:mml="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML"> <mml:mrow> <mml:msub> <mml:mi>H</mml:mi> <mml:mi>ν</mml:mi> </mml:msub> <mml:mrow> <mml:mo>(</mml:mo> <mml:mi>β</mml:mi> <mml:mo>)</mml:mo> </mml:mrow> </mml:mrow> </mml:math> is the relative entropy and $$C(\mu ,\nu )$$ <mml:math xmlns:mml="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML"> <mml:mrow> <mml:mi>C</mml:mi> <mml:mo>(</mml:mo> <mml:mi>μ</mml:mi> <mml:mo>,</mml:mo> <mml:mi>ν</mml:mi> <mml:mo>)</mml:mo> </mml:mrow> </mml:math> is the optimal transport distance. This minimization problem is also solved in the Jordan-Kinderlehrer-Otto scheme. We also show that for compact metric spaces, when c is a Lipschitz cost function, even in the presence of non-unique Kantorovich potentials, the solution the minimization problem has Lipschitz Radon-Nikodym derivative.

Nonlinear Differential Equations and Applications NoDEAVol. 32(6)
University of Oregon (US)
Division of Mathematical Sciences
Openalex Percentile: Top 100%
Markov Chains and Monte Carlo Methods
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